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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STAT'E OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. No. 9712 
COY RINGO, 
Defend-omt and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STAT'EMENT 
The parties will be referred to throughout the Brief 
by their given names, or as the ST'ATE AND DEFEN-
DANT~ 
Pages cited by statements concerning evidence will 
refer to the Reporter's Transcript of Testimony, and the. 
record of the case on appeal. 
All Italics are mine. 
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STATEMENT' OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a Jury Verdict finding the 
defendant, Coy Ringo, guilty of the crime of malicious 
aforethought assault on a convict in the Utah State, 
Prison with an instrument, namely, a laundry pin, con-
trary to the provisions of Title 76, Chapter 7, Section 12, 
Utah Co~de Annotated, 1953, as amended by the laws of 
the State of Utah, 1961. 
At the trial of the defendant, he was represented by 
a Jimi Mitsunaga, Esq. 
Thereafter, the Court appointed Dwight L. King to 
represent the defendant, and to perfect this Appeal. 
All statements concerning the facts are based on the 
record on appeal, and the transcript of evidence on 
appeal since the present Counsel for the defendant has 
no personal knowledge of any occurrence and must rely 
therefor solely upon the Record made by the Trial Court. 
On December 30, 1961, defendant was a convict in 
the Utah State Prison, committed on August 6th, 1958. 
(R. 85) Defendant was assigned to the Section lmown as 
B-N orth of the State Prison, a maximum security section. 
Also assigned to Section B-N orth was a convict by 
the name of Howard LeRoy Ollerdisse. 
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Defendant, between 11:00 o'clock and 12:30 left his 
cell No. 213 and entered an area known .as "Inmate 
Security Area'' as shown on Exhibit 13, and in the 
inmate security area, he, and the inmate Ollerdisse 
commenced an .affray. As soon as the guards were able, 
the two convicts were replaced in their respective cells, 
defendant in 213, and Ollerdisse in 209. The doors to 
both cells were closed and both men were immediately 
subjected to physical examinations. Exactly how the 
defendant obtained access to the inmate security area, at 
the same time as Ollerdisse was in said area is not shown, 
by the evidence, although it is hinted at by the witnesses 
that he in some way jammed the mechanism which locked 
his cell and in this way kept the cell open until Ollerdisse 
came into the inmate Security area. 
The affray between Ollerdisse and defendant was 
witnessed by guards who testified concerning the fact 
that both Ollerdisse and defendant struck several blows 
at their opponent in the affray. 
An examination of Ollerdisse revealed that he had 
two punctured type wounds, one in the abdomen, .and one 
in his rib cage. The punctured type wound in the abdo-
men had caused internal bleeding to the point where 
Ollerdisse was required to undergo surgical repair of 
the wound in his stomach at the· Salt Lake County 
Hospital. 
The guards at the State Prison immediately follow-
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ing the affray and after the convicts had been returned 
to their respective cells, while the convicts were out of 
the cells, conducted a shake-down of the cell and searched 
the convicts. No we.apon was ever found which could be 
responsible for the wound in Ollerdisse's stomach and 
chest. 
The State introduced two Exhibits, one a Laundry 
pin which had been straightened out, and the other a 
laundry pin which had not been straightened out, and it! 
is the claim of the State that a similar laundry pin 
straightened out was the weapon, or instrument, which 
the defendant used on the convict Ollerdisse. 
There was no evidence that anyone ever s.aw such a 
weapon in the hand of defendant, and with the exception 
of statements made by the defendant himself, outside of 
the Trial Court, there is no evidence whatsoever to 
connect a laundry pin with the defendant or with the 
wound which the convict, Ollerdisse, suffered. 
The only evidence connecting laundry pins or any 
weapon with the defendant is testimony by Ferris Andrus 
and Ernest D. Wright. They testified about a statement 
which the defendant gave when questioned about the 
affr.ay. At the time Andrus questioned the defendant, 
there was present Andrus who is deputy Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County, the Deputy Warden, Fitzgerald, Ernest 
Wright, Execut,ive Director of the Pardon Board, and Lt. 
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Jooston. (R. 229, 230, 231) The conversation with de-
fendant took about between 35· minutes to an hour. De-
fendant was not represented by Counsel. Andrus did not 
inform Ringo he was charged with any crime, that he 
had a right to be represented by Counsel, did not tell 
him that he had a right not to incriminate himself, nor 
apparently was defendant informed that he did not have 
to discuss the occurrence with Ollerdisse. (R. 234, 235, 
236) No promises were made to the defendant, nor 
threats of force used against him. (R. 241) Witness 
Wright agrees that defendant was never informed about 
being charged, that he had a right to Counsel, but 
disagrees with Andrus, concerning whether or not Andrus 
informed defendant that whatever he said would be 
used against him in Court. (R. 243, 244) 
Proper objections were taken by Counsel on the 
ground that no proper foundation had been laid, and 
that the statements made by the defendant were not 
voluntary. (R. 245) Counsel also moved the Court to 
strike and exclude Andrus and Wright's testimony on 
the ground that they violated the defendant's rights 
under the Federal and State Constitution. (R. 2'92) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER 
SECTION 12, ARTICLE 1, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, IN THAT HE WAS COMPELLED 
TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIMSELF. 
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.ARGUMENT· 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER 
SECTION 12, ARTICLE 1, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, IN THAT HE WAS COMPELLED 
TO GIVE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIMSELF. 
The defendant, at the time he w.as questioned by 
the Deputy Sheriff, Executive Director, Deputy Warden, 
and other officials at the State Prison, was in the maxi-
mum security section of the prison. Evidence showed 
that his cell was, in effect, a solit.ary confinement cell, 
that there were solid steel doors on the front of the cell 
which were closed each night from 4:30 P.M. until 8 
o'clock the next morning. The force of prison discipline 
could well be appreciated by the defendant. 
The circumstances, it is submitted, are calcul.ated to 
impress upon the mind of the defendant, the great power 
that the Deputy Warden and the other prison officials 
h.ad over him, and which, if his conduct was less than 
cooperative, they had full power to discipline him for. 
It is submitted that under the circumstances his state-
ments in answer to the· questions by Andrus were not 
voluntarily given. He had not come to the hearing at 
his own request and he certainly was under duress and 
in a position where his will was not effective. He was 
involuntarily incarcer:ated and disciplined. 
The right against self incrimination has long been 
carefully guarded, not only by the Federal, but by the 
State Courts, and there is a gre.a t abundance of judicial 
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precedence concerning the protections that the defendant 
is entitled to do. 
In St(J)te v. Braasch, 119 U. 450, 229 P 2d. 289, this 
Court considered the question of whether or not a con-
fession was voluntary and pointed out that certain con-
duct was important to protect constitutional rights of 
the defendant. They include that fact, that the defendant 
was not subject to physical discomfort, and "defendant 
was fully informed of his rights." (P. 292) Defendant 
was never informed about his rights before the confes-
sion nor even informed that an investigation for a crime· 
was under way. No waiver of rights by defendant here 
is possible since no knowledge of rights was ever given. 
It has been stated that the compulsion prohibited is 
not alone physical or mental duress, such as comes from 
unlawful commands and authoritative orders by those 
engaged in extorting testimony, but comprehends also 
the lesser degree of compulsion which subjects the citizen 
to some ,important disadvantage to procure the evidence 
which is desired, should they extract it from him. U. S. 
v. Bell, 81 Fed. 830, Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. 
Ct., 524, 29 L. E,d 746. 
It is defendant's position that because of the force, 
apparent and actual, that the Deputy Warden and the 
other officials had over him, he was compelled to answer 
all questions that were submitted to him. 
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Section 64-9-39 U C A 1953, gives to the Warden and 
D·eputy Warden permiss,ion to punish convicts for mis-
conduct. The only restrictions being that the convict 
cannot be showered with cold water or whipped with a 
lash on the bare body. Defendant was already under 
strict discipline, being kept in solitary confinement, it 
seems unH!kely that he would not he aware of the power 
the Deputy Warden had and what could happen to him 
if he refused to cooperate. 
Under State and Federal Constitutions, the rule for 
State Courts must be that no person shall, at any time, 
he compelled to answer any question, or s.ay anything 
which might be confession of commission of public of-
fense, or which might be used against him rin an attempt 
to convict him of public offense. See authorities cited 
by this Court in St~ate v. Braasch, 119 U. 450, 229 P 2d., 
289 p. 292; Layman v. Webb, 350 P. 2d 323. 
It has always been the rule that a confession may be 
regarded as obtained by compulsion, and therefore in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment, where the defendant 
was not advised of his rights. U. S. v. Kallas, 272 Fed. 
742. The Federal rule and probably the Utah rule was 
set down in the Kallas case. 
"Testimony as to a confession upon a trial is 
admissible in evidence, though not sufficient to 
convict; but the Court is now asked to go a step 
further, and hold that the alleged confession 
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obtained by an inquisition to which the accused 
was subjected while held in jail, at the mercy of 
his jailer, is admissible, without first showing that 
it was freely and voluntarily made, .after the 
accused was fully advised of his rights and 
warned of his danger." (P. 74·6) 
"Upon the question of what constitutes com-
pulsion, within the meaning of constitutional 
provisions simil.ar to the fifth amendment, the 
following synopsis is taken from Words and 
Phrases. Vol. 2, p. 1351. 
''Const. art. 1, Sec. 6, declares that no person 
shall be compelled in any criminal case· to be a 
witness against himself. Held, that the word 
'compulsion' as there used, means merely com-
pulsion exercised through the process of the 
Courts, or through laws acting directly on the 
party, and has no reference whatever to an in-
direct or argumentative pressure, such .as is 
claimed is exerted by Act 1869 (Laws 1869, c, 
678) declaring that on a criminal trial the accused 
shall at his own request, but not otherwise, 
be deemed a competent witness against himself. 
People v. Courtney, 94 N.Y. 490, 493." (P. 751) 
( 5) "The accused may be presumed to know 
the law - that is, th.at any statements or admis-
sions which he voluntarily makes will be used 
against him ; but he will also be presumed to 
know that he will not be compelled to be a witness 
against himself and that involuntary statements 
cannot be used in evidence against him. Hence, 
the question for determination is whether, in the 
absence of evidence that the accused was com-
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pelled to make the statements attributed to him 
- that is, evidence other than that of his im-
prisonment or arrest - they can be considered 
as evidence against him. Even if he were advised 
that he was not compelled to answer .and that 
statements which he made might be used in evi-
dence against him, while constituting prima facie 
evidence that the statements were voluntarily 
made, .and therefore admiss,ible in evidence, it 
would not be conclusive for the examination of a 
detained prisoner might be so prolonged, and 
of such a character, and made under such cir-
cumstances, that .a court might reasonably con-
clude that it was not voluntary, even though he 
was so warned. 
''The questioning by or with the consent of 
his official captor of a prisoner is essentially 
inquisitorial in its nature. He is confined, .and 
perforce must submit to such questions. True, 
he may remain silent; but he cannot escape the 
questions, as he mright if he were physically free. 
The actual existence of duress, arising from the 
fact that he is confined .and cannot escape his 
questioner, is sufficient, and requires that he be 
advised that he is not compelled to answer, and, 
if he does so, his answers will be used against 
him. Fairness can require no less. So much .at 
least is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 
How can it be said, if a court required an accused 
to answer upon the witness chair, with the alter-
native of going to jail if he refused, was such 
compulsion as to invalidate the evidence so ob-
tained, and, at the same time, that a prisoner 
questioned in jail by his captor was not compelled 
to give evidence against himself? 
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"Such a course would be to very nearly, if 
not quite, blind oneself as to what constitutes 
compulsion. As above pointed out, the compul-
sion forbidden by the amendment - or at least 
included ~n its prohibition - is compulsion exer-
cised through the process of the court. The com~ 
mitment by which the petitioner in the present 
case was held in jail is no less compelling process 
than were he in court and ordered upon the wit-
ness chair for examination. In fact, there is 
greater need to safeguard the rights of the ac-
cused ~n this particular, when under arrest, than 
in the court, for in court ,a record is made that 
will, eventually, afford protection, however great 
the abuse practiced. It may not always be so of 
the prisoner subjected to an inquisition in his 
cell. 
"While it may be that many know of their 
rights, and, even when in prison, have the will 
and courage to stand upon them, there certainly 
are others who do not. The safer and better 
course to pursue is to require evidence that each 
and every prisoner has been advised of his right 
to remain silent, and warned of the danger in 
speaking, before any statement made is admitted, 
rather than enter upon a more or less speculative 
inquiry as to whether the statements of accused 
were made voluntarily or not. In the nature of 
things, it often happens, not only upon the exam-
ination in the jail, but upon that in court regard-
ing the circumstances of the inquiry at the jail, 
that there are many against one, the accused. 
Whether it arises from zeal or prejudice, born of 
their calling, the nature of the accusation or 
situation, or all of these and other things, it does 
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not matter - consciously, or unconsciously, upon 
such inquisition, the police, .and officers having 
similar duties, often array themselves against 
the accused. An instance of this is to be noted in 
the present case. While both of the witnesses for 
the prosecution were asiked to tell all that accused 
said when he w.as examined at the jail, it re-
mained for the leading questions of the attorney 
for the accused to elicit the fact that the accused 
was a discharged soldier of the late war, .although 
many things had been upon direct examination 
recounted, no more pertinent, but which would 
not reflect such credit upon the accused. 
''The demurrer to the petition will be over-
ruled." p. 753 
CON.CLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted th.at defendant has been 
deprived of his constitutional rights to not give evidence 
against himself. The Judgment of the Court should be 
set aside. 
Respectfully submitted 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Counsel for Defendant 
2121 South State Street 
8alt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
